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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OP UTAH, : 
v. : 
SCOl. T T YNWOOD PERRY. • : . Case No. 20070694-CA 
DeJendai it /'Appellant. : Appelk::.: 'r- :;,»;:rceri:ieu. 
ARGUMENT1 
POINT. MR. PERRY'S DUE PROCESS RIGHT TO PRESENCE AT THE 
PROBATION EVIDENTARY HEARING DOES NOT HINGE ON WHETHER 
THE STATE BELIEVES HIS PRESENCE WOULD BE USEFUL. THE RECORD 
DEMONSTRATES THAT THERE WAS NOT AN EFFECTIVE WAIVER OF 
THE RIGHT TO PRESENCE AT THE PROBATION HEARING AND 
THEREFORE MR. PERRY'S DUE PROCESS RIGHT WAS VIOLATED. 
A defendant's right to his day in court is not contingent on whether the State 
rKiic\c^ liis presence wouij .>eii>ck;i. . \ppeiiee I5;*:ci ; :•; see Carman v. Slavens, 546 
v - • • • " ' . • • . . . . > , . . , * : . , • • , • , . ! X . : . v ; , - . ; i l 
favor of permitting parties to ha\c their das in coun on ihe merits of the controversy."*;; 
cf American Bush v. City of South Salt Lake, J'.;()' : - -. * ; , ; _J35 
iNrliiiii i h , niiii" H ;i\) \ny phunlilTs drsen c "IL i. I.i, ih > • i • t"" - r • If" " f 1 • 
outcome of such a remand might be preordained"), do the contrary, "a day in court 
means," at a minimum, that a "party shall be afforded the opportunity to present claims 
ai id defenses, ai id 1 la ;e 1 1 i :M i i pi ;: pei ly adji idical ed oi i tl i 21 i iei its accordii ig to the facts and 
the law." Miller v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co., 2002 UT 6,1142, 44 P.3d 663 (internal footnote 
omitted); see Christiansen v. Harris, 163 P.2d 314, 316 (Utah 1945) (explaining that due 
process guarantees a party "shall have the right to a hearing before a competent court, 
with the privilege of being heard and introducing evidence to establish his cause or his 
defense, after which comes judgment upon the record thus made"), overruled on other 
grounds by Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964). 
Absent from the probation statute and applicable case law is any caveat that a 
probationer's due process right to be present, present evidence, and speak in his own 
behalf at a probation evidentiary hearing is contingent on whether the state believes it 
would be useless or not. In fact, cases cited by the state as contravening a defendant's 
due process right actually support rather than limit the right to be present during a 
probation evidentiary hearing and defend in person. See Appellee Brief 9-11, 15; 
Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S 730 (1987); Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 (1934). 
A defendant's right to presence is "assumed" when "[i]t bears, or may fairly be assumed 
to bear, a relation, reasonably substantial, to his opportunity to defend." Snyder, 291 U.S. 
at 106 (determining "Fourteenth Amendment does not assure a defendant the privilege to 
be present at [inspection of scene of offensej at the same time as the jury "where nothing 
is said by anyone to direct the attention of the jury to one feature or another."). "[A] 
defendant is guaranteed the right to be present at any stage of the criminal proceeding 
that is critical to its outcome if his presence would contribute to the fairness of the 
procedure." Stincer, 482 U.S. at 745 (defendant's due process right not violated by 
2 
exclusion from victim's competency hearing where "[n]o question regarding the 
substantive testimony that the two girls would have given during trial was asked at that 
hearing"). 
Where the probation statute and applicable case law mandate that a trial court 
"hold a hearing in order to extend, modify, or revoke probation, unless that right is 
waived," in order to find that a probationer has violated the terms of probation, due 
process assures a defendant's right to presence no matter how futile the State may deem 
the hearing. State .v Orr, 2005 UT 92, ^16, 127 P.3d 1213 (citing Utah Code Ann. §77-
18-l(12)(a)). 'The hallmarks of due process are notice and an opportunity to be heard." 
Utah County v. Ivie, 2006 UT 33,1J22, 137 P.3d 797 (citation omitted). The supreme 
court has said Utah's due process clause "guarantee[s] that litigants will have their 'day 
in court/" Duke v. Graham, 2007 UT 31, ^|23, 158 P.3d 540 (citation omitted); see 
Bailey v. Bayles, 2002 UT 58,1J11 n.2, 52 P.3d 1158 ("Wrapped up in the bundle of 
procedural rights associated with a party's right to a 'day in court' is the fundamental 
right of. . . notice and an opportunity to be heard in a meaningful way." (citation 
omitted)); Miller, 2002 UT 6 at [^41 (holding "due process clause, at the very least, 
requires that every claimant 'be afforded his "day in court"" (citation omitted)); 
Christiansen, 163 P.2d at 316 ("Many attempts have been made to further define 'due 
process' but they all resolve into the thought that a party shall have his day in court."); 
Gitsch v. Wight, 211 P. 705, 706 (Utah 1922) ("That every person has a right to his day 
3 
in court and an opportunity to be heard before he can be deprived of a justiciable right is 
too elementary for discussion."). 
In this case, absent a knowing and voluntary waiver, due process assured Mr. 
Perry's right to appear in person and speak in his own behalf, cross-examine witnesses 
and present evidence in mitigation that the violation did not warrant revocation. The 
record adequately supports that such a waiver did not occur. As argued in Appellant's 
Opening Brief, trial counsel did not inform the court that he had discussed the issue of 
waiver with Mr. Perry, explained the benefits or consequences, and secured a knowing 
and voluntary waiver from Mr. Perry. See Appellant Opening Brief 16-22. Rather, trial 
counsel put on the record that he was waiving Mr. Perry's presence because "he [was] in 
prison" and he did not "see that there [was] any reason to bring [Mr. Perry to court]." R. 
204:31. Apparently aware of the significance of Mr. Perry's absence the trial court noted 
to defense counsel that although he has "indicated [he] would be happy waiving his 
appearance . . . if [Mr. Perry | objects at some later point" the court would need to be 
informed. R. 204:33. Trial counsel responded "I guess so. I think that's the only thing 
we can do. There's no reason to keep bringing him up here for something where he's 
already in prison for." R. 204:33. 
On August 22, 2007, the trial court received a letter from Mr. Perry informing it 
that he objected to being denied his right to be present at the probation evidentiary 
hearing and desiring to appeal the court's decision. R. 178-82. Mr. Perry's letter 
objecting to the denial of his presence at the probation revocation hearing was received 
4 
by the court shortly after the revocation hearing where the court explicitly gave Mr. Perry 
the opportunity to object and the letter was the first chance Mr. Perry had to make his 
legal argument regarding his denial of due process. R. 204:33. 
The record adequately demonstrates that there was not a knowing and voluntary 
waiver from Mr. Perry of his due process right to be present at the probation evidentiary 
hearing. The exchange between trial counsel and the court establishes that counsel had 
not discussed the matter of waiver with Mr. Perry nor obtained a waiver of his presence. 
In absence of such a waiver, trial counsel was ineffective for proceeding with the hearing. 
Given the adequate record on appeal, remand for a rule 23B hearing was unnecessary. 
Mr. Perry maintains that his incarceration on another conviction did not necessitate his 
revocation of probation and had the right to present the trial court with such a defense. 
The denial of Mr. Perry's right to do so was prejudicial and this Court should remand for 
a new evidentiary hearing. See U.S. v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659 (1984) ('There are, . . ., 
circumstances that are so likely to prejudice the accused that the cost of litigating their 
effect in a particular case is unjustified.). 
5 
CONCLUSION 
As more fully set forth in the Opening Brief, Appellant, Scott Lynwood Perry, 
respectfully requests that this Court remand for a new evidentiary hearing to allow Mr. 
Perry to speak in his own behalf and present mitigating evidence arguing against 
revocation of his probation. 
SUBMITTED this / £ day of August, 2008. 
DEBRA M.NELSON 
Attorney for Appellant 
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